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All parties are listed in the caption of the case. Defendant/Appellee South Jordan
City (the "City") refers to Plaintiffs/Appellants, collectively herein as "Plaintiffs.5'
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the first issue Plaintiffs raise
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court correctly held that when a municipality has in fact

decided the issues Plaintiffs raise, Plaintiffs' characterization of their suit as an
"enforcement action" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 does not avoid the
limitations applicable to appeal of a municipality's land use decisions set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The district court's decision construing the statutes presents a
question of law which diis Court reviews for correctness. State ex rel. Div. of Forestry
Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, P8, 44 P.3d 680.
2.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions on appeal, this Court cannot reverse and

remand on the question whether die district court erred in "denying Appellants' Motion
for Summary Judgment" because the district court rendered no judgment on that issue:
"[Bjased on the untimeliness of plaintiffs' petition for review, defendants' Motion to
Dismiss is hereby granted. Accordingly because plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment is moot, the Court declines to address that motion further." (R. 300; 303-04.)
Were this Court inclined to address the issue raised by Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment without the benefit of the district court's prior review, the issue
presented would be whether the City properly applied and interpreted its zoning
ordinances in approving a site plan allowing for a parking structure within the Jordan
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River corridor, which presented mixed questions of fact and law. "A municipality's land
use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference35 (Springville Citizens for a Better
Comnuuiitv v. City of Springville, 199 UT 25, 11 23, 979 P.2d 332, 336), and the Court
should reverse the decision at issue in this case only if it is not supported by substantial
evidence. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
10-9-1001. Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this
chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2) (a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a
property owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with
the private property ombudsman under Section 63-34-13 until 30 days after:
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or
(B) the private property ombudsman issues a written statement under
Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator.
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the
specific constitutional taking issues that are die subject of the request
for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman by a
property owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private property
ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2) (a) to file a petition
has expired does not affect the time to file a petition.
2

(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
10-9-1002. Enforcement.
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in which
violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter
occur or are about to occur may in addition to other remedies provided by law,
institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building,
use, or act.
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction.
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce die ordinance by withholding building
permits.
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the use of any
building or other structure within a municipality without approval of a building
permit.
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of and for the
proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or use fully conform to
all regulations then in effect.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.

This case arises from Plaintiffs' disagreement with the City's decision, on
Februaiy 14, 2001, to approve a site plan proposed for the Riverpark Corporate Center
("Riverpark Project") by Anderson Development Company ("developer53). (R. 4-9; 1220; 28-66.) Plaintiffs contended below and continue to argue here that the site plan is
3

"illegal" because it places parking lots in an area designated as a "recreation/open space or
preservation area[]" on the City's Land Use Map, and because die Master Development
Agreement ("MDA") between the City and developer requires that the area "should be
kept clear of buildings and structures." (Id) Plaintiffs argue that the City's initial
approval of die site plan was mistaken, and when Plaintiffs eventually asserted their claims
in the summer of 2001, after construction had already commenced, the City should have
issued stop work orders pursuant to its enforcement authority. (Id.)
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting the Court to rule
on their arguments as a matter of law. (R. 96-110.) The City responded to Plaintiffs'
arguments on the merits, but also filed its own Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
Plaintiffs' challenge to the City's land use decision to allow the parking lot was untimely
and barred by the 30-day time limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. (R. 204-15.)
The district court found the City's argument pursuant to § 10-9-1001 to be valid, and
dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint as untimely. (R. 300; 303-04.) Because the district court
found Plaintiffs' Complaint was time barred by § 10-9-1001, the court expressly did not
consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or the arguments on the merits
of Plaintiffs'claims. (R. 300.)
B.

Statement of Facts.

The facts relevant to the district court's decision are few and they are undisputed.
The City sets forth those material facts in 1111 1 through 6, below7. To the extent the Court
reaches Plaintiffs' second issue, which die district court did not consider, Plaintiffs have
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failed to point out conflicting evidence in the record supporting die City's decision, and
the City describes those facts in 1111 7 through 12.
i.
1.

Facts Relevant to the District Court's Decision.

The proposed site plan for the Riverpark Project identifies and describes

construction of landscaped parking areas within a "River Corridor Area." (R. 5-6, 1120;
65-66; 218, 118.)
2.

The City's Planning Staff reviewed the proposed site plan and recommended

it for approval to the City Planning Commission. (R. 219, 1111 10, 11.)
3.

The City Planning Commission then held a public hearing with respect to

the proposed site plan, and thereafter recommended the site plan for approval to the City
Council. (Id.)
4.

On February 14, 2001, the City Council held a public hearing with respect

to the proposed site plan, and thereafter unanimously approved the proposed site plan for
the Riverpark Project. (R. 5-6, 1120; 78, 1111; 219, 1112.)
5.

On or about July 9, 2001, and after construction had commenced on the

Riverpark Project pursuant to the approved site plan, Plaintiffs first notified the City of
their claims concerning the site plan and subject parking lots. (R. 100, 103 115.)
6.

Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint in district court until on or about

October 4, 2001. (R. 1.) Plaintiffs' Complaint takes issue with the location of the
parking lots in the "River Corridor area" as originally depicted on the site plan approved
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by the City Council, and requests that the approval and construction of the lots be
declared illegal. (R. 6-9.)
ii.
7.

Facts Relevant to the City's Decision to Approve the Site Plan.

City Ordinance 97-7 does not require that die "River Corridor" area

"continue to be maintained for recreation, open space and preservation uses55 as Plaintiffs
assert. (Plfs.5 Br. at p. 4 (emphasis added).) Rather, the Ordinance provides that the "100
year flood plain and meander corridor . . . shall continue to be designated on the [City's]
Future Land Use Plan Map as recreation/open space or preservation areas.55 (R. 13.)
8.

The City's "recreation/open space55 land use designation, in turn, does not

preclude parking lots as accessories to uses such as parks, golf courses, equestrian parks,
etc. (R. 218-19, 1111 6-17.)
9.

The Plaintiffs quote only selectively from the MDA. In addition to those

portions quoted by Plaintiffs, the MDA provides:
. . . All buildings or other improvements shall be located
outside of the river Corridor Area except as approved in
writing by the City and as provided in this Agreement. . . .
. . . Some structured parking will be used. All open space
shall be maintained by a property owners5 association, unless
otherwise provided herein. The open space areas shall be kept
free and clear of buildings and structures and are for the
purpose of providing areas for recreation, trails, view areas,
drains, canals, wetlands, slope protections, and like matters as
approved by the City. All areas within the meander corridor
within the River Corridor Area shall be designed by the
Master Developer or Developer(s) to provide for landscaping
to the river, paved pathways for pedestrians/bicycles, picnic
areas, access to the Jordan river, wetland areas and otiier
public uses. . . . All parking Jots developed in conjunction
6

with the Project on any portion of the Property or the
Peterson Property shall be available for public use on
weekends and after normal business hours. During weekdays,
a minimum ten (10) parldng spaces will be reserved at all
times form public use at the north end and south end parldng
lots within the Project. Additional public parking will be
permitted on a space available basis during regular business
hours during the week.

The obligations of Master Developer and the City set forth in
his Agreement shall not create any rights in or obligations to any
other persons or parties except to the extent otherwise provided
herein.
(R. 33-34, 53.)
10.

Even assuming Plaintiffs had some rights pursuant to the MDA, the City

determined that die proposed parking lots sewed the City's recreation and open space
purposes by providing public parldng for and access to the river corridor and a paved path
along the corridor, and approved die parldng lots, in writing. (R. 217-20.)
11.

With respect to those portions of the MDA requiring open spaces to be kept

clear of "buildings'5 and "structures," die City zoning ordinances define a "building,35 as "a
structure having a roof supported by columns or walls, used or intended to be used for die
shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, or property;55 and "structure,55 as "[a]ny object or
building erected or constructed on a lot or parcel which exceeds 6 feet in height or exceeds
2 feet in height and forms a geometric shape covering a ground area greater dian 30
square feet.55 (R. 128-33, 207.)

7

12.

The City's only decision on the matter approved the site plan with its

parking lot locations, the City has never found a "violation" of its ordinances, and
therefore could not, as a factual matter, be "informed" of such violations by Plaintiffs.
(R. 217-20.)
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T
It is significant that months prior to Plaintiffs' suit, die developer followed the
City's ordinances by presenting a proposed site plan to City planning staff, to the City
Planning Commission, and eventually to the City Council. The site plan clearly showed
parking lots within areas Plaintiffs argue have been designated as "recreation/open space or
preservation areas" on the City's Land Use Map, and areas Plaintiffs argue the MDA
requires "should be kept clear of buildings and structures." The City then approved the
site plan through a full and complete public approval process, including public hearings
before the City Planning Commission and the City Council.
Plaintiffs now mount a collateral attack on this decision by characterizing their
Complaint raising the same issues addressed in die public review and approval process as
an "enforcement" action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002. The District Court
correctly held that under such circumstances where a municipality has actually made a land
use "decision" applying the requirements of its' ordinances to the factual conditions which
plaintiffs assert constitute violations, § 10-9-1002 does not provide an "alternative" remedy
that allows Plaintiffs to avoid the limitations imposed by § 10-9-1001. To hold otherwise
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would vitiate the requirements of § 10-9-1001, and render that section of essentially no
force or effect.
Plaintiffs' arguments on the second issue they raise are both procedurally and
substantively flawed. The District Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment because it found Plaintiffs' Complaint was untimely and barred by
§ 10-9-1001. To die extent this Court wishes to consider Plaintiffs' arguments, Plaintiffs
wholly fail to overcome the presumption of validity the Court must accord the City's land
use decision because it is plainly supported by the language of the applicable ordinances
and the MDA which Plaintiffs chose to ignore.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS CANNOT AVOID THE 30-DAY TIME LIMITATION OF
§ 10-9-1001 BECAUSE THE CITY ACTUALLY DECIDED THE ISSUES
RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS5 COMPLAINT BY APPLYING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF ITS5 ORDINANCES TO THE FACTUAL
CONDITIONS WHICH PLAINTIFFS ASSERT CONSTITUTE
VIOLATIONS, AND UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES § 10-9-1002
DOES NOT APPLY.
Citing Culbertson v. Bd. of County Commr's of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 108,

44 P.3d 642, Plaintiffs argue that § 10-9-1002 simply provides alternative remedies to
those both allowed and limited by § 10-9-1001. (Pis.5 Br. at 15-21.) However, Plaintiffs5
argument ignores critical factual distinctions between Culbertson and this case, other case
law rejecting their argument, and advances an interpretation of the two statutes that would
render meaningless the 30-day limitations period of § 10-9-1001.

9

In Culbertson, the essence of the Plaintiffs' claims were that a developer was failing
to comply with conditions imposed by the County through its approval of a site plan and
conditional use permit ("CUP"). Such claims raised issues independent of decisions
already made by the County. In fact, as the Court's description indicates, the County had
largely failed to decide Plaintiffs' claims and enforce the County's approvals:
Plaintiffs notified Hermes and the County (collectively
defendants) twice through legal counsel that the Ernst building
encroached upon 1070 East Street, restricting access to their
property. They asked the County to enforce the applicable
ordinances, building codes, and Herme's CUP to stop the
encroachment and ensure diat 1070 East Street complied with
county roadway standards. Finally, plaintiffs filed an action
challenging the adoption of die Ordinance both substantively
and procedurally and requesting enforcement of county
roadway standards and the CUP.

Plaintiffs, after pursuing certain administrative
remedies, then filed the instant actions alleging that the Ernst
building and the building labeled "retail 2" (the Future Shop
building) on the site plan were built in violation of the county
zoning ordinances, county roadway standards, and the CUP
because they encroached upon North Union avenue and 1070
East Street and because the buildings were built without the
proper setbacks and landscaping. The back wall of the Future
Shop building was built on die vacated eight-foot-wide strip of
the former North Union Avenue that ran in front of plaintiffs'
homes, parallel to the closed twenty-five-foot segment.
Plaintiffs alleged that these violations deprived them of
adequate access to their property They prayed for a
declaration that die buildings violated die above ordinances
and the CUP and sought to invalidate die roadway standards
exceptions granted to Hermes by the County. In addition,
diey petitioned the court to order the County to enforce its
ordinances and the CUP by removing the offending portions
of the buildings, and also sought damages by from Hermes.
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Culbertson at 11H 6, 8, 44 P.3d 642. It is apparent that in Culbertson the only issues
raised that had been previously decided by the County concerned the roadway standards
exemptions the County had granted to the developer, which plaintiffs attacked directly
Id.
Addressing the application of § 17-27-1001 to plaintiffs5 claims, the Culbertson
Court held that plaintiffs3 "enforcement53 claims, those requesting the Court to enforce
County approvals which had not previously been addressed by the County, were not
subject to the exhaustion of remedies restrictions because plaintiffs were not challenging
land use "decisions.55 I d at 1111 29-31, 44 P3d 642. The Court went on to analyze the
roadway standards exemption claims, the claims that had been previously decided, on
separate grounds entirely. Id at HH 32-34, 44 P.3d 642. As to those claims, the Court
held that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary because the underlying
ordinances did not require it. I d
In this case, by stark contrast, it is significant that prior to Plaintiffs5 "enforcement55
action, die developer followed die City's ordinances by presenting a proposed site plan to
City planning staff, to the City Planning Commission, and eventually to the City Council.
The site plan clearly showed parldng lots within areas Plaintiffs argue have been designated
as "recreation/open space or preservation areas55 on the City's Land Use Map, and areas
Plaintiffs argue the MDA requires "should be kept clear of buildings and structures." The
City then approved the site plan through a full and complete public approval process,
including public hearings before the City Planning Commission and the City Council.
11

As a factual matter, therefore, the City made a land use "decision53 through its site
plan review and approval process. It did so pursuant to its ordinances and the MDA and
thereby decided the very same factual and legal issues Plaintiffs have collaterally attacked
and asked the Court to decide here. By the same token, Plaintiffs have not claimed that
the developer has failed to comply with conditions imposed by the site plan approval
process, or located the parking lots in areas other than where they were expressly
approved, or failed to landscape the lots, or raised any other issues independent of those
directly raised in the site plan review and approval process. The Culbertson opinion is
thus inapposite to Plaintiffs3 argument.
The inapplicability of the Culbertson opinion to Plaintiffs5 argument is further
illustrated by a line of decisions construing § 17-27-1001 on facts similar those presented
here, which Culbertson did not address, all of which support the district court's decision
that § 10-9-1002 does not simply provide Plaintiffs with an "alternative55 to § 10-9-1001
by which to attack the City's decision, regardless of whether plaintiffs characterized their
suits as "enforcement55 actions. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P2d 40 (Utah
1964)(challenging building permit which allegedly violated county ordinances); Merrihew
v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)(challenging
revocation of building permit); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep 5 t., 685 P.2d 550
(Utah 1984)(challenging denial of building permit).
In Lund, this Court addressed essentially the same argument Plaintiffs make here.
There, plaintiff contended that he was not required to exhaust available administrative
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remedies pursuant to the predecessor to § 17-27-10021 because defendants were in
violation of the zoning ordinance and accordingly the predecessor section allowed him to
pursue alternative remedies directly in district court. Lund, 392 P.2d at 42.
The Court rejected the Lund plaintiffs5 argument. The Court noted that while the
predecessor section gave a landowner a cause of action in the courts when a violation of a
zoning resolution is charged, it held that "where, as in this case, the alleged violation of
the ordinance arose from the administration of a zoning ordinance by an administrative
officer or agency, as provided in [the predecessor of § 17-27-1001], appeal from that
administrative ruling should have been taken to the proper administrative tribunal." 392
P.2d at 42. See also, Merrihew v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Common, 659 P.2d 1065,
1067 (Utah 1983) (reaffirming "the general proposition of law that parties must exhaust
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review is applicable to claims
relating to denial of a building permit.

. . . By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus.")(citations omitted).
More recently, in Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App.
1995), the Utah Court of Appeals relied on Lund to reject die arguments Plaintiffs make
here on virtually identical facts. In Bennion, the Utah County Commission had approved

}

That predecessor section provided that, in the case of a violation or a proposed
violation of the act, "any owner of real estate within the district in which such building,
structure of land is situated, may , in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute
injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions35 to prevent
proposed violations. Lund, 392 P.2d at 42 n.2 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23).
13

Sundance's Recreational Resort Plat A. Prior to exhausting administrative remedies,
Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court alleging the plat and Commission's approval
violated Utah County zoning ordinances and Utah law, and seeking mandamus relief
ordering the Commission to limit any further approvals of the Sundance plat in violation
of the ordinances. Bennion, 897 P.2d at 1233-34.
The district court granted Sundance's motion to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by § 17-27-1001. IcL On
appeal, plaintiff argued, like Plaintiffs argue here, "that section 17-27-1002 permits him to
initiate mandamus proceedings against Sundance because Sundance was in actual violation
of the zoning ordinance, and thus his complaint should not have been dismissed in its
entirety." Id. at 1237.
Rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals followed the Lund opinion, and
stated:
[PjlaintifPs complaint is with die Commission's decision that
the Sundance plat complied with the zoning ordinance. We
therefore hold that plaintiff was required to appeal that
decision to the Board. Plaintiff has no separate cause of action
against Sundance pursuant to section 17-27-1002.
Id
Similarly in this case, Plaintiffs' Complaint is with the City Council's decision to
approve the site plan locating parking lots in areas Plaintiffs claim they should not be
located under the City's own ordinances. This is a "decision" made under the City's
ordinances which are promulgated "under authority of [die Municipal Land use
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Development and Management Act].35 Utah Code Aim. § 10-9-1001. Pursuant to Lund,
Merrihew, and Bennion, Plaintiffs have no separate cause of action under § 10-9-1002.
Moreover, this Court will "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative," Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662
(Utah 1997), and "attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative
intent so as to give meaning to each provision." Davis County Solid Waste Management
v City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60 11 10, 52 P3d 1174. To hold, on these facts as
Plaintiffs argue, that § 10-9-1002 simply provides an "alternative55 remedy to that provided
by § 10-9-1001 would render the limitations period of § 10-9-1001 meaningless. Under
such an interpretation, anyone claiming a zoning or planning decision violated a city's
ordinance could file suit at any time, without respect to the availability of more direct
administrative remedies or the time the decision was made. That is not the implication of
the CuJbertson decision, nor proper application of the plain language of the statutes to the
facts in this case.2

2

The two Oregon decisions Plaintiffs cite are similarly inapposite to Plaintiffs5
argument, and actually support the district court's decision here. In Clackamas County v.
Marsoa 874 P2d 110 (Or. App. 1994), the Court noted:
The circuit court enforcement process is available when the
matter at issue is not subject to the land use decision process
or susceptible to resolution through a land use decision.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more pristine occasion for
an enforcement action than this case: According to the
county's allegations, petitioner is conducting a use that violates
the zoning ordinance, and she has filed no application to allow
that use or have it declared permissible through a land use
decision.
15

Nor does it assist Plaintiffs to argue that the City code makes violations of the code
"a separate offense for each day the violation exists/3 and mandates the City issue a stop
work order at any time "it determines a use is in violation of the City code." (Pis.5 Br. at
24-25.) The limitations provision of § 10-9-1001 runs from the time the municipality
renders a land use "decision/5 not from the time a violation occurs. Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001(2). As a factual matter, it is undisputed that the City decided the very same
issues raised by Plaintiffs5 Complaint through a comprehensive public approval process
which was completed on February 14, 2001. The City made no "decisions55 on each day
Plaintiffs allege a violation exists.3
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SHOWN THE SITE PLAN AND ITS
LOCATION OF PAJUCING LOTS VIOLATES THE CITY'S
ORDINANCES OR THE MDA.
As a threshold matter, the Court should not consider Plaintiffs5 arguments on die

merits because the district court did not reach such arguments in dismissing Plaintiffs5
Complaint on procedural grounds. The case Plaintiffs rely on, Higgins v. Salt Lake

Clackamas County, 874 P2d at 112 (emphasis added). Clearly in Clackamas County, the
county had not previously approve ' '
' doner's site plan, as is the case here. And in
Doughton v Douglas County, 750
4 (Or. App. 1988), the plaintiffs5 allegations
were like those made in Culbertson: "[Plaintiffs] principal argument about the partition
[of property, which plaintiff challenged] is that respondents have not followed the farm
management plan upon which he contends the county's approval was conditioned.55
Doughton, 750 P2d at 1175 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs here make no allegations that
the developer is not placing the parking lots where they were approved in the site plan.
3

Even if it could be argued the City "decided55 the issues again on or about July 9,
2001, when it was notified of Plaintiffs5 claims, Plaintiffs did not file suit until October
2001, well beyond 30 days after the notification.
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County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), is inapposite because it involved this Court
upholding the district court's judgment on grounds not considered by the district court,
not potentially reversing the district court based on arguments that were moot below.
In the event the Court does consider Plaintiffs5 arguments, the Court should
presume the City's decision to approve the parking lots in the areas designated on the site
plan is valid. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). Plaintiffs, therefore, bear the burden of
demonstrating that based on die facts before die City and the ordinances at issue, there is
no evidence or basis to uphold the City's decision to approve the site plan. L± See also,
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Plaintiffs wholly fail to meet this burden.
This is tine because the City's ordinances may be read as allowing die parking lots
in areas designated for "recreation/open space or preservation" under the factual
circumstances present here. As set forth above, that land use designation does not
preclude parking lots as an accessory use to uses such as parks, golf courses, equestrian
parks, etc. The MDA, in turn, provides, in pertinent part:
All areas within the meander corridor within the River
Corridor Area shall be designed by the Master Developer or
Developer(s) to provide for landscaping to the river, paved
pathways for pedestrians/bicycles, picnic areas, access to the
Jordan river, wetland areas and other public uses. . . . All
parking lots developed in conjunction with the Project on any
portion of the Property or the Peterson Property shall be
available for public use on weekends and after normal business
hours. During weekdays, a minimum ten (10) parking spaces
will be reserved at all times form public use at the north end
and south end parking lots within the Project. Additional
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public parking will be permitted on a space available basis
during regular business hours during the week.
Thus there is ample evidence supporting a determination that the parking lots in
the areas designated "recreation/open space or preservation" are, as required by the
designation, "accessories53 to the permitted use.
Plaintiffs' other arguments, based on the MDA, are similarly flawed. Plaintiffs rely
on a provision that cc[a]ll buildings or other improvements shall be located outside of the
river Corridor Area except as approved in writing by the City and as provided in this
Agreement," but ignore the fact that the parking lots as located on the site plan have been
approved in writing. Plaintiffs also rely on the provision that "[t]he open space areas shall
be kept free and clear of buildings and structures and are for the purpose of providing
areas for recreation, trails, view areas, drains, canals, wetlands, slope protections, and like
matters as approved by the City,53 but ignore the fact that City ordinances do not define
the parking lots at issue as "buildings33 or as "structures.35
Merely because the City could have come to an alternative conclusion which could
also be reasonably supported by the record is of no import. The appropriate standard of
review defers judgment to the City where diere is some evidence in the record to support
it. The City correctly concluded that the location of parking lots on the site plan
conformed to City ordinances and the MDA, and that decision should not be overturned
by the Court, even if Plaintiffs5 challenge was timely filed, which it was not.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully requests that this Court
uphold the district court's well-reasoned decision dismissing Plaintiffs5 Complaint as barred
by the limitations provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The Court should not
reach the second issue Plaintiffs5 raise, because it was moot and not considered by the
district court. In the event this Court determines to reach the second issue, it should
uphold the City's decision approving the site plan and location of the parking lots at issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ?

day of January, 2003.
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